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I. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Whether the Grease Spot is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
II. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
A. The Harnes are Not Entitled to Recover Attorney Fees Incurred in 
Arbitration 
It is not permissible to award attorney fees in arbitration unless the arbitration 
agreement expressly so provides. I.C. § 7-910; Storrer v. Kier Construction Corporation, 
129 Idaho 745, 746, 932 P.2d 373 (Ct. App. 1997). Furthermore, there is no: 
... basis to conclude that the legislature, in enacting I. C. § 
12-120(3), intended to grant parties an independent right of 
action simply for the recovery of attorney fees incurred in 
arbitration, when such fees clearly cannot be awarded as 
part of the arbitration. 
Id., 129 Idaho at 747. 
Hames rely heavily on I.C. § 41-1839, and the case law which is developed 
around that statute, as support for their position here. That reliance is misplaced. 
I.C. § 41-1839 is an implied term in every insurance contract. Emery v. United 
Pacific Insurance Company, 120 Idaho 244,247, 815 P.2d 442 (1991). In Pendlebury v. 
Western Casualty and Surety Company, 89 Idaho 456, 406 P.2d 129 (1965), the court 
described it as: 
... axiomatic that the obligation of I.C. § 41-1839 became 
part and parcel of the contract of insurance to the same 
effect as though incorporated therein. 
89 Idaho at 470. 
The axiom referenced in the Pendlebury decision arises from numerous cases in 
which statutes regulating the business of insurance were claimed to unconstitutionally 
impair contractual obligations. For example, in Penrose v. Commercial Travelers 
Insurance Company, 75 Idaho 524, 275 P.2d 969 (1954), the insurance company 
challenged the enforceability of an attorney fees statute relative to an insurance policy 
issued before the statute was passed. With respect to this challenge, the Penrose court 
held: 
The particular statute relates to insurance business carried 
on in this state; such business is affected with the public 
interest and the private rights of contract in relation thereto 
must be and are subjected to the valid exercise of the police 
power by the legislature. Intermountain Lloyds v. 
Diefendorf 51 Idaho 304, 5 P.2d 730. It is under the 
inherent police power vested in the legislature that it saw fit 
to subject any insurance company, where an action is filed 
and successfully prosecuted to judgment in any court in this 
state for recovery on any of its policies issued herein, to the 
payment of a reasonable attorney's fee. 
75 Idaho at 537. 
In Halliday v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 89 Idaho 293, 404 P.2d 634 
(I 965), a successful plaintiff on an uninsured motorist claim against his automobile 
insurance company was awarded attorney fees under LC.§ 41-1839. The written demand 
made against the insurance company before the plaintiff filed suit was substantially 
greater than the verdict rendered by the jury. However, the insurance company did not 
ever tender any amount "justly due" to the plaintiff. The insurance company appealed the 
attorney fees awarded under Idaho Code § 41-1839, claiming that because the amount 
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originally demanded by the plaintiff exceeded the amount of the verdict, the statute did 
not authorize an award of attorney fees. 89 Idaho at 295-296. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court quoted with approval portions of the analysis set 
forth in Penrose v. Commercial Travelers Insurance Company, 75 Idaho 524, 275 P.2d 
969 (1954): 
... The parties entered into the insurance contract charged 
with the knowledge of the reserved police power of the 
state which may at any time be invoked in the promotion of 
the general welfare by enlarging from time to time the 
remedies and procedures in connection with insurance 
contracts .... 
89 Idaho at 299 (quoting 75 Idaho at 539). 
As the above authorities indicate, the nature of the insurance business is unique, 
rendering insurance companies subject to legislative authority not ordinarily applicable to 
businesses in general. One manifestation of this circumstance is that LC. § 41-1839 is 
rendered part of every insurance policy in Idaho. 
It is because LC. § 41-1839 is an implied contractual provision of every 
insurance policy that LC.§ 7-910 and LC.§ 41-1839 were reconciled and reconcilable in 
Emery v. United Pacific Insurance Company, 120 Idaho 244, 815 P.2d 442 (1991). In 
Emery, the insurance policy required arbitration of disputes between the company and its 
insured. The policy required the expenses of arbitration to be shared equally between the 
company and the insured, "unless they agree otherwise". 120 Idaho at 246-247. 
The trial court awarded attorney fees to the insured under LC. § 41-1839. The 
insurance company appealed, relying on Bingham County Commissioners v. Interstate 
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Electric Company, 105 Idaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046 (1983), for the proposition that under 
I.C. § 7-910 it is beyond the scope of an arbitrator's powers to award attorney fees to one 
of the parties absent a contractual agreement to do so. 120 Idaho at 246. 
The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's award of attorney fees. In doing so, 
the Supreme Court left intact the holding of Bingham County, supra, ruling instead: 
However, that limitation upon an arbitrator does not extend 
to the authority of the district court to award attorney fees 
pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839. 
120 Idaho at 246. 
The analysis of the Emery court as to why it upheld the award of attorney fees 
was as follows: 
This Court has previously held that the provisions of I.C. § 
41-183 9 become part of the insurance contract to the same 
effect as though incorporated therein. Pendlebury v. 
Western Casualty and Surety Company, 89 Idaho 456, 406 
P.2d 129 (1965). LC.§ 41-1839 provides in pertinent part: 
41-1839. Allowance of Attorney Fees in 
Suits Against Insurers.-(!) Any insurer 
issue any policy, certificate or contract of 
insurance, surety, guaranty or indemnity of 
any kind or nature whatsoever, which shall 
fail for a period of thirty (30) days after 
proof of loss has been furnished as provided 
in such policy, certificate or contract, to pay 
to the person entitled thereto the amount 
justly due under such policy, certificate or 
contract, shall in any action thereafter 
brought against the insurer in any court in 
this state for recovery under the terms of the 
policy, certificate or contract, pay such 
further amounts as the court shall adjudge 
reasonable as attorney's fees in such action. 
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Pursuant to this implied term in the insurance contract, the 
parties agree that the insurer is obligated to pay attorney 
fees if the insured is compelled to file suit to recover under 
the insurance policy. As an implied term in the insurance 
contract, the statutory language of LC. § 41-1839 modifies 
the general American Arbitration Association rule that 
parties must bear equally all expenses of arbitration, except 
those associated with the presentation of witnesses. Where 
the insured is required and compelled to file a lawsuit by 
reason of an insurer's refusal to pay in order to recover 
under her insurance contract, we hold it is implicit in LC. § 
41-1839 that the court shall adjudge a reasonable award of 
attorney fees against the insurer. 
120 Idaho at 247 (emphasis original) 
Because of the nature of the insurance business, LC. § 41-1839 is an implied 
contractual part of every insurance policy. As such, every insurance policy which 
requires disputes between insurance companies and their insureds to be resolved by 
arbitration include "in the agreement to arbitrate", consistent with LC. § 7-910, the fee 
shifting requirements of LC. § 41-1839. That such is the case in Idaho, however, is 
unique to the subject of the law pertaining to insurance. The same does not hold true in 
other areas. 
Hames advocate that LC.§ 12-120(3) should be deemed an implied term of the 
contract at issue in this case. In Storrer v. Kier Construction Corp., 129 Idaho 745, 932 
P.2d 373 (Ct. App. 1997), that same argument was rejected by the Court of Appeals. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is not a required or implied term in any contract of a commercial 
nature. If it were, the court in Storrer would not have affirmed the ruling of: 
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... the district court [which] rejected Storrer's contention 
that a right to recover attorney fees under LC.§ 12-120(3) 
is implied into every contract involving a commercial 
transaction. 
129 Idaho at 747. 
Insurance policies are adhesion contracts and the parties do not have the ability 
to negotiate the terms included in those policies. As such, the state reserves extensive 
police powers to require, on behalf of insureds, that certain provisions must be included 
in the policies. LC. § 41-1839 is such a provision. 
Ordinary contracts of a commercial nature are not susceptible to the same 
concerns that exist relative to contracts of insurance. The parties are, as they were here, 
generally able to negotiate the various terms of their contracts. The jurisprudential bases 
for imposing, as a contractual provision, the terms of LC. § 41-1839 into every contract 
of insurance do not exist for ordinary commercial contracts and the provisions of I.C. § 
12-120(3). 
Had the parties here desired a fee shifting provision like that in LC. § 12-120(3) 
to be part of their contract, they could have easily included it. They did not do so, 
however. Their agreement nowhere states that one party would be liable for the other's 
attorney fees in the event of a dispute. The parties' agreement did, however, make 
express provision for disputes to be resolved in arbitration. Under LC. § 7-910, each 
party is to bear its own expenses in the arbitration in the absence of an agreement to the 
contrary. There was no such agreement to the contrary here. As such, Judge Hosack's 
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holding is correct, and should be affirmed, with respect to attorney fees incurred in 
arbitration by the Hames. 
B. Attorney Fees Incurred Before Arbitration and Attorney Fees 
Incurred After Arbitration. 
Hames argue that Deelstra v. Hagler, 145 Idaho 922, 188 P .3d 864 (2008) 
mandates an award of all the attorney fees incurred by Hames both before and after the 
arbitration proceeding below. That argument is misplaced. 
Deelstra is limited in application to the issues addressed there. Specifically, the 
Supreme Court noted that: 
Deelstra does not challenge the District Court's prevailing 
party determination, nor the amount of the fee award. 
188 P.3d at 866. 
In this case, with respect to attorney fees claimed for legal work done before 
arbitration, Judge Hosack correctly addressed both the issue of prevailing party and the 
amount of the award: 
The Court finds that Hames prevailed in the civil litigation 
with regard to the issue of compelling arbitration. The 
Grease Spot commenced the civil litigation and Harnes 
attempted to move the matter into arbitration. Harnes was 
successful in doing that. The attorney fees incurred in 
context of civil litigation over a commercial transaction in 
obtaining the order of a court compelling arbitration should 
be properly recoverable in the civil litigation. However, 
attorney fees incurred in defending or prosecuting the civil 
claims itself are not necessarily issues upon which a party 
prevailed in the civil litigation. Since the matter went into 
arbitration, a court would have to refer to the arbitration 
proceeding to conduct an analysis of the prevailing party. 
Instead, this court looks to the issues upon which the party 
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R. 80. 
prevailed in civil litigation itself. The issue upon which 
Harnes prevailed was the issue compelling arbitration. 
Harnes is therefore entitled to an award of attorney fees 
incurred in compelling arbitration. The court finds that 
16.9 hours of attorney time prior to March 20, 2006 to be 
appropriately attributable to compelling arbitration. 
Determining the issue of "prevailing party" requires analysis of three principle 
factors: (I) the final judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) 
whether there were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and (3) the extent to 
which each of the parties prevailed on each of the claims or issues. Sanders v. Lanlford, 
134 Idaho 322, 325, I P .3d 823 (Ct. App. 2000). The determination of prevailing party is 
one of discretion for the trial court. Id.; Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 79 P.3d 723, 
727 (2003). 
The trial court correctly determined that the only issue upon which Hames 
prevailed before the court was the issue of compelling arbitration. R. 80. Armed with 
counsel's time entries [R. 64-67] the trial court was able to determine an appropriate 
award for the time counsel spent before arbitration on the subject of compelling 
arbitration. R. 80. The trial court correctly acted in its discretion and should be affirmed 
with respect to the issue of attorney fees allowable prior to the commencement of 
arbitration. 
Hames also seek attorney fees for events following issuance of the arbitrator's 
award. The trial court correctly observed that proceedings for confirmation of arbitrator's 
awards under the Uniform Arbitration Act are designed to be summary. R. 79. Indeed, 
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under I.C. § 7-911, an award is automatically confirmed upon presentation thereof absent 
a timely objection. 
Harnes relied below on Driver v. SI Corp., 139 Idaho 423, 80 P.3d 1024 (2003) 
for the proposition that "disbursements" under I.C. § 7-914 include attorney fees. See R. 
79. However, Driver was concerned with "non-meritorious protracted confirmation 
challenges". 139 Idaho at 429. Here, as the trial court noted, no objection to 
confirmation was raised by The Grease Spot. Harnes never sought modification or 
correction of the award relative to the question of attorney fees pursuant to LC.§ 7-913. 
Review of the record reflects that the Hames' attorney fees incurred after the 
arbitrator's initial award detennination were incurred in an unsuccessful attempt to 
persuade the arbitrator to change his mind, and otherwise incurred pursuing attorney fee 
awards. See R. 64-67. Attorney fees incurred for activities directed at the arbitrator are 
not, as discussed above, recoverable under the circumstances of this case. Attorney fees 
incurred pursuing attorney fees are likewise not recoverable. 
For example, in Kaelker v. Turnbull, 127 Idaho 262, 899 P.2d 972 (1995), the 
Koelkers sought and were awarded attorney fees incurred quieting title clouded by breach 
of the warrant of seizen. The trial court awarded those attorney fees, plus attorney fees 
incurred by the Koelkers in their attempts to recover those attorney fees after title was 
quieted. 
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment as to the attorney fees incurred after 
title was quieted, holding that "the only attorney fees which are recoverable as damages 
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are those which are directly attributable to quieting title in the property". 127 Idaho at 
266. 
In Allison v. John M. Biggs, Inc., 121 Idaho 567, 826 P .2d 916 (1992), the 
Supreme Court held that the then existing version of LC. § 12-120 "does not provide for a 
post-judgment award of attorney fees". 121 Idaho at 568. The current version of LC. § 
12-120(5) does allow for post-judgment awards of attorney fees, but only where such fees 
are "incurred in attempting to collect on the judgment". 
Review of the record in this case reveals that the arbitrator's award was rendered 
June 25, 2007. R. 42-49. Review of counsel's time entries [R. 66) reveals that the 
attorney fees incurred by Hames from that date forward were directed at further 
proceedings before the arbitrator, and attempts to recover a judgment from the court for 
attorney fees. The obtainment of quiet title in the Kaelker case is analogous to the entry 
of the arbitrator's award in the present case. The Koelkers were entitled to recover the 
attorney fees they incurred obtaining quiet title as damages. However, once quiet title 
was obtained, the legal bases upon which attorney fees could be awarded ceased to exist. 
In the absence of some other statutory or contractual basis for an award of attorney fees 
thereafter, the Koelkers were not entitled to recover such fees. 
In this case, the contest over the merits of the parties' dispute over their 
"commercial transaction" was resolved upon entry of the arbitrator's Memorandum 
Decision. From that point forwarded, Hames' legal efforts have been directed at not the 
merits of the underlying case, but on their quest to recover attorney fees. LC.§ 12-120(5) 
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clearly indicates that post-judgment attorney fees are awardable only with respect to 
attempts to collect on a judgment. Such is not an allowable basis for an award of attorney 
fees. 
Judge Hosack's ruling on the subject of attorney fees incurred after arbitration is 
consistent with the above. Under the circumstances of this case, the only "necessary" 
step required for Harnes to reduce the arbitrator's award to a judgment was the ministerial 
act described in LC.§§ 7-911 and 7-914. In the words of Judge Hosack: 
R. 79. 
It is this Court's finding that in a normal confirmation of 
arbitration proceedings pursuant to 7-914, an award of 
attorney fees is unnecessary. The Court finds that this is 
true in the instant case as well. 
It is clear that Judge Hosack perceived the issue before him as one within his 
discretion. It is also clear that Judge Hosack correctly perceived that the summary 
ministerial task of reducing the arbitrator's award to a judgment did not warrant an 
assessment of attorney fees. The work done was secretarial in nature and Judge Hosack 
was correct in his ruling. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
The trial court's assessment of costs and attorney fees was correct in all respects. 
This court is respectfully requested to affirm the District Court. 
DATED this 9 ~ay of October, 2008. 
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